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Over the last two decades the Australian financial system has experienced substantial 
deregulation, but the superannuation sector has run counter to this overall trend.  While 
the superannuation sector has become a major segment of the financial system, it is our 
conjecture that this growth has been the result of compulsion not choice by economic 
agents.  There are two forms of compulsory contributions to superannuation: the first is 
award superannuation under which employers are required to contribute three per cent of 
wages to a superannuation fund specified in the award.  The second is the Superannuation 
Guarantee, SG, under which employers are required to pay a specified proportion of 
salary, currently nine per cent, to a superannuation fund of their choice.  Although these 
contributions are fully vested and trustees are required to invest such contributions for the 
benefit of members, employees have no effective choice about which fund is to receive 
their contributions and no choice about whether to retain accumulated balances in the 
original fund.  
 
In this paper, we argue that this lack of choice violates the fundamental principle of 
consumer sovereignty under which it is held that consumers are the best judges of their 
own welfare and ought to be able to consume anything they can afford to buy.  Similarly, 
in the investment area, consumers are the best judges of their own welfare and should be 
able to place their retirement savings in any product they choose. 
 
The lack of choice of both initial and subsequent superannuation fund leads to a lack of 
competition in the superannuation sector.  Trustees of superannuation funds are assured 
of both a flow of captive contributions and stability of accumulated balances which 
removes incentives to operate the fund at lowest cost much less in line with member 
preferences.  Most superannuation fund accounts are held in defined contribution (or 
accumulation) funds so the members of those funds bear the full investment risk but have 
little say over the investment policy of the fund. 
 
The Commonwealth government had announced its policy allowing members of 
superannuation funds to have unrestricted choice on portability of accumulated balances 
in superannuation funds and had published the regulations under the Superannuation 
Industry Supervision Act (SIS Act).  The proposed date under which these would have 
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become effective was July 2004; however, these regulations have been disallowed by the 
Senate in September 2003. 
 
In this paper, we distinguish between choice of superannuation fund (which would allow 
employees to select the fund in which their contributions are placed) and portability of 
superannuation balances, under which employees would be able to transfer their 
accumulated balances to another superannuation fund.  The Commonwealth 
Government’s policy on choice of superannuation fund was defeated in the Senate in 
2001.  There is a close link between the two policies but it is feasible there could be one 
without the other.  Later in the paper we discuss this link. 
 
The paper initially examines the issues under portability and proceeds under the 
following sections: an economic analysis of portability of accumulated balances; Wallis 
Committee recommendations; current Government proposals; and, possible answers to 
objections to portability. 
 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PORTABILITY OF ACCUMULATED BALANCES 
 
Superannuation funds operate as trusts; the trustee is the legal owner of the assets in the 
superannuation fund and invests them for the beneficial owners, the members.  Trustees 
have explicit duties under common law and legislation including the SIS Act to act 
prudently and in the interests of beneficiaries.  However, Drew and Stanford (2003c) 
argue that, generally, members, who are not allowed to appoint or direct trustees, have no 
influence over trustee decisions and that trustees are unduly influenced by funds 
managers to operate funds for the benefit of funds managers.  This has important 
implications for the operational efficiency of the superannuation sector.  Under current 
circumstances, trustees have no obligation to allow members to transfer accumulated 
balances between funds so that members have no way to influence trustees’ decisions.  
For members of superannuation funds, their accumulated superannuation balances are an 
illiquid, unmarketable long term asset because, while superannuation contributions are 
fully vested in members, superannuation balances must be preserved in the 
superannuation environment until at least age 55; current policy arrangements are to 
extend this progressively to age 60 by 2025. 
 
Under current arrangements, members have no choice of fund (i.e. the right to select the 
fund to which their contributions will be directed) and no general right to transfer 
accumulated balances from one fund to another.  Both of these restrictions represent a 
welfare loss to members, as members will incur higher costs and lower returns as a result 
of inappropriate investment strategies than alternative strategies which are available.  We 
would predict that the introduction of portability of superannuation balances would 
increase welfare. 
 
The current position is made worse by the absence of effective consumer protection 
measures.  The Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) has a corporate 
culture of referring member complaints to the superannuation fund for reply, Stanford, 
(2003).  Moreover, the Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC), is 
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reluctant to act on consumer complaints about superannuation fund performance, 
Valentine (2003).  Trustees are supposed to act in the interest of members but, in general 
do not as trustees are ‘managed’ by asset consultants and funds managers, Drew and 
Stanford (2003a).  Trustees who are generally inexperienced in financial matters accept 
the conventions of the funds management industry as espoused by asset consultants and 
funds managers.  These conventions include a reliance on active funds management 
(despite the evidence that active managers underperform benchmarks), a fee structure 
which is a flat percentage of funds under management (FUM) rather than a flat 
management fee with an incentive bonus for outperformance.  Trustees support the goal 
of funds managers to maximise FUM.  The interests of fund managers are threatened by 
proposals for extended portability of superannuation balances so that it comes as no 
surprise to see that the broader funds management industry opposes portability on the 
paternalistic ground that members are unable to select the appropriate fund. 
 
The effect of portability would be to re-allocate balances between funds, but it is 
important to note that there is no possibility of a “run” on superannuation funds as 
balances are preserved till at least age 55 (as noted above current policy is to extend this 
to age 60 years.).  If members took the opportunity to consolidate balances into a smaller 
number of accounts, there is no a priori expectation that any particular class of funds or 
particular funds would suffer a net outflow of funds.  Moreover, the net transfer of funds 
would be reduced considerably if there was a clearinghouse arrangement (analogous to 
bank clearinghouses) so that considerable “netting” takes place prior to settlement. 
 
However, the possibility of a major transfer of balances between funds would occur if 
members chose to transfer funds from one class of funds to another class of funds.  In this 
event, we would argue a major transfer of funds from a particular fund is evidence of 
member dissatisfaction with the trustees and their policies and, thus, is further evidence 
that trustees are not fulfilling their duties to members.  One would hope that, in these 
circumstances, trustees would review their procedures and policies so as to reduce the 
outflow of funds and the quasi-rents garnered by funds managers.  If trustees do not 
respond, the appropriate response is not to place limits on portability but to replace the 
trustees. 
 
It might be expected that trustees will attempt to erect barriers to portability through the 
imposition of exit fees.  In general, there is little justification for such fees.  Trustees have 
little difficulty in unwinding investments as most fund assets are placed on highly liquid 
exchange traded markets so that there is no difficult in realising assets at short notice.  
Trustees are unlikely to experience short term cash flow problems as now SG 
contributions are required to be paid quarterly and there are regular flows from interest 
and dividends, and maturing discount securities.  Funds which would experience cash 
flow problems in these circumstances are poorly managed and require a change in 
management policies or closure. 
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In the superannuation system, there are two types of funds: defined benefit funds (DBF) 
and accumulation or defined contribution funds (DCF).  DBF funds promise a retirement 
benefit defined in an objective way, usually final salary and years of service so that 
typical retirement benefits are a pension of x per cent of final salary subject to a 
qualifying period or a lump sum equivalent to y times final salary.  Under DFB funds the 
liability to meet the promise is assumed by the fund’s sponsor, usually the employer.  On 
the other hand, in a DCF, the retirement benefit is simply the accumulation of 
contributions and earnings less expenses.  Under a DCF, members bear the entire 
investment risk whereas in a DFB fund this risk is carried by the employer.  For this 
reason, we argue that portability needs to apply only to members of defined contribution 
or accumulation funds as the expected value of the terminal benefit to members of these 
funds is uncertain (as it depends on the investment performance of the strategy 
implemented by trustees).  Most superannuation accounts are held in defined contribution 
or accumulation funds; in these funds, the members bear entirely the investment risk i.e. 
the risk that trustee decisions will produce poor returns or high costs and thus it is 
appropriate that members should be able to choose the fund in which to hold their 
balances. 
 
Figure 1 shows the membership of superannuation funds by sector of the economy; the 
major features to note are that the overwhelming majority of accounts are in private 
sector accumulation funds.  Membership of defined benefit funds is a very small 
proportion of the total and largely confined to the public sector; membership of defined 
benefit funds has been declining for some time as such funds are closed to new members.  
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Source: Calculated from APRA data. 
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Figure 2 confirms these observations, highlighting that over 90 per cent of 
superannuation accounts are held in accumulation funds.  
 









Accumulation  Total  Defined Benefit Hybrid
Source: Calculated from APRA data
 
For members of DCF plans, the concept of accumulated balances is quite clear and the 
amount of accumulated balances in any particular circumstance can be readily and 
accurately calculated.  This is not so for members of DBF funds whose entitlement is for 
a benefit payable at retirement conditional upon events which exist at retirement.  As 
most DBF plans are unfunded (i.e. the fund holds no assets to back the liabilities which 
are paid from current revenue as they emerge).  Most public sector DBF, particularly in 
the Commonwealth sector is characterized by this design.  There would be very few 
members of funded DBF and, we would assert, none who were required to join such 
funds under the schemes of compulsory superannuation. 
 
Although superannuation coverage of employees is now high with over 90 per cent of 
full-time employees covered under the SG with some of these also covered by award 
superannuation, there is a large proportion of the population with low accumulated 
balances in superannuation as a result of prolonged unemployment and withdrawal of 
women from the workforce to assume family responsibilities. 
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We take it that the goals of a member of an accumulation fund are to obtain the 
maximum terminal balance after making allowance for risk, i.e. to have the maximum 
balance at the age when the member can exit the superannuation system. We have 
formally demonstrated (see Drew and Stanford 2002a) that the important variables which 
determine the terminal balance are the gross investment returns earned by the fund and 
the expense rate of operating the fund; the net return is usually referred to as the crediting 
rate.  The gross investment returns earned by the fund will depend on the asset allocation 
of the fund i.e. the proportion of the fund’s portfolio in each asset class and the market 
return to each asset.  The formal model we have used is readily converted to an Excel 
spreadsheet which enables calculation of terminal benefits under specified assumptions. 
 
The expenses incurred by the fund are of two major types: administrative expenses which 
are usually charged as a flat dollar amount per annum and the expenses of investing the 
portfolio.  For instance, the expenses of the university superannuation scheme, Unisuper, 
are an administrative fee of $127 a year and an average investment expense ratio of 0.37 
per cent of FUM; as will be seen from the upcoming table this average investment 
expense ratio is low for the industry. 
 
We argue that there is a clear strategy for members of superannuation to maximize their 
terminal benefit.  This strategy is to concentrate on minimizing expenses.  The general 
rules are to consolidate balances: 
 
(1) To avoid paying the administrative expenses fee more than once; 
(2) Into a fund which charges wholesale fees rather than retail fees (up to 80bps 
benefit); and; 
(3) Into a passively managed fund rather than actively managed funds (up to 100bps 
benefit). 
 
This rule says to combine similar accounts to reduce administrative fees.  To give some 
idea of the gains from following rule (1) above are significant; saving an administrative 
fee of $127 a year would increase balances by nearly $8,500 over 30 years assuming an 
average earning rate of 5 per cent a year. 
 
The second rule, to consolidate balances into an account charging wholesale fees rather 
than retail fees, will reduce both administrative costs and investment expenses.  As 
shown in Table 1, all types of corporate superannuation funds have lower costs than retail 
funds so that it may be possible for a member to effect a saving of as much as 0.8 per 
cent or 80 basis points a year by following this rule.  The effect of such a saving on 
accumulated balances after 30 years is material and, on reasonable assumptions, would 
increase the terminal benefits by at least 15 per cent. 
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The third rule, to consolidate balances into passively managed funds rather than actively 
managed funds, would also produce a material benefit for members.  Malkiel and 
Radisich (2000) estimate that, in the USA, the investment expense ratio for a passively 
managed equity fund is 20 basis points a year; Pozen (2002) reports that, in the USA, the 
Federal Thrift plan, a retirement vehicle for most Federal employees, offers a small 
number of broadly diversified stock and index plans, (investment choice in Australian 
terminology), with an annual expense ratio of seven basis points (or .07 per cent).   
Allowing for the fact that some expenses may be absorbed by the employer, Pozen 
estimates that the full costs of pension plans based on the Federal Thrift plan would be 30 
basis points per annum.  We discuss the relative performance of actively and passively 
managed funds later but, for the moment, note that the majority of Australian 
superannuation funds are actively managed.  The gains from following rule are 
potentially high (at the extreme 94 basis points a year for members of retail personal 
superannuation funds) but are material for all members except government funds. 
Importantly, implementation of all of these rules requires no detailed knowledge of funds 
or of the past returns of funds; nor does it require quantitative knowledge of the 
performance of funds. 
 
We now ask if members can select funds which provide excess returns i.e. returns higher 
than a market benchmark.  We have shown that retail equity superannuation 
underperform, after taking into account the risk exposure of the funds against standard 
benchmarks, Drew and Stanford (2003b) and we conclude from this that members of 
such funds are better served by a passively managed fund.  This research confirms 
findings from the United States and the UK.  We also have found that higher investment 
expenses are associated with lower returns to the portfolio, Drew and Stanford (2003c). 
Furthermore, any superior performance by active funds managers does not persist, Drew, 
Stanford and Taranenko (2001), Drew and Stanford and Veeraraghavan (2002); this 
supports the current convention that past performance data of superannuation funds does 
not provide an indication of future performance.  However, we find that there is some 
evidence that the lowest cost cohort of wholesale funds have produced slight excess 
returns, Drew, Stanford and Veeraraghavan (2002).  From this we conclude that there is 
no information which would enable members of superannuation funds to predict future 
performance and that it is pointless for members to attempt to do so.  We conclude that 
the appropriate strategy for members with more than one superannuation account is to 
minimize costs by following our three rules above.  Following these rules will also 
provide the best opportunity to increase the gross returns of the chosen fund. 
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Table 1: Costs of Superannuation Fund by Type of Superannuation Fund 
 
Type of Fund 
Investment 
Cost 
(% of FUM) 
Administration 
Cost 
(% of FUM) 
Distribution 
Cost 











0.40 0.35  0.10 0.85 
Large  
Industry  0.45 0.60  0.10 1.15 
Government  0.20 0.23  0.00 0.43 
Retail - Small 
Retail Employer 
Master Trust 
0.60 0.90  0.50 2.00 
Retail - Personal 
Super  1.24 0.60  0.50 2.34 
Note: These costs exclude entry and exit fees. 
Source: Rice and McEwan (2002) 
 
The extent to which members can consolidate balances depends on the extent to which 
superannuation funds are open. Some funds accept as members only from a particular 
class of persons such as employees of a particular enterprise or industry. Some other 
funds are closed in the sense that they will not accept new members. An example of a 
fund which is closed in both senses is the Commonwealth Superannuation Schemes, one 
of the largest funds in Australia, is a fund exclusively for Commonwealth public servants; 
it has been, for some years, closed to new members.  
 
What is important in accounting for costs of superannuation funds is access to wholesale 
investment rates (we discuss this later in the paper) and distribution costs. On both 
counts, retail funds have comparatively high costs. Costs of government funds are low 
because the administration of superannuation has been integrated into the payroll 
function and many government funds are un-funded. 
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WALLIS COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The Wallis Committee recommended that superannuation fund members should have a 
greater choice of fund and that employees should be provided with choice of fund, 
subject to any constraints necessary to address concerns about administrative costs and 
fund liquidity. 
 
The Wallis Committee specifically recommended that members should have the right to 
transfer the vested amounts to any complying fund.  On exercise of that right, payments 
should be transferred to the chosen fund as soon as practicable, subject to controls 
necessary to maintain orderly management for the benefit of all fund members.  Transfer 
costs, including those incurred as a result of regulatory requirements should be 
transparent and reasonable. 
 
The Wallis Committee concluded that that fund management fees in Australia appear to 
be higher than those in comparable countries and that one of the major potential reasons 
for higher costs in Australia is the fragmentation of the managed funds industry and that 
rationalisation would be assisted by stronger competition and the removal of regulatory 
constraints on the amalgamation of funds.  Stronger competition and other reforms may 
also drive further efficiencies.  Regulatory changes which could improve the performance 
of superannuation sector include regulatory constraints in superannuation.  The existing 
arrangements restrict competitive pressure in the sector which provides member choice of 
fund only to self-employed individuals; and members of public offer superannuation 
schemes, who, subject to exit fees, can transfer accrued voluntary entitlements to other 
schemes. 
 
However, the Wallis Committee noted that member choice raises several concerns: 
(1) Administrative costs for employers and funds are likely to be greater if freedom 
of choice is unfettered and can be exercised at will.  If members exercise choice 
frequently, additional exit/entry fees may offset any increase in investment 
returns; 
(2) Choice also raises issues for fund liquidity.  Investment strategies may need to be 
adjusted to hold more liquid assets and may result in greater focus on short-term 
investment performance.  However, the Committee pointed to United States’ 
experience suggests that investor choice has not led to higher volatility in fund 
liquidity; 
(3) These problems may be partly addressed by imposing some limitations on exit, 
such as a suitable notice period or limits on the frequency of change.  Subject to 
these constraints, the additional competition engendered by choice is likely to put 
downward pressure on costs and to encourage rationalisation of the industry; 
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(4) Member choice will be successful in promoting competition only if consumers 
have appropriate information.  It is the joint responsibility of the industry and 
regulators to ensure that consumers are educated and well informed.  Education 
should cover issues such as the rights of members, different life cycle needs and 
their implications for risk and return, and the benefits and costs of exercising 
choice; and, 
(5) Consumer protection will need to cover requirements for good disclosure, proper 
regulation of the sales and advice process (including licensing of investment 
advisers), and speedy dispute resolution where problems occur. 
 
We maintain that the Wallis Committee has overestimated the difficulties associated with 
portability of balances.  Earlier in the paper we argued that liquidity problems are likely 
to be minimal and advanced the normative proposition that trustees should not be 
protected from members’ dissatisfaction manifested through withdrawal of balances.  We 
also argue that once a portability regime has been established a high level of withdrawals 
is unlikely as the fundamental strategy to maximise retirement benefits is to adopt a 
passive buy and hold strategy under which market returns with only a small discount will 
be obtained. 
 
CURRENT GOVERNMENT PROPOSALS 
 
The current proposals of the Government are:  
 
(a) To allow portability through changes in the regulations of the Superannuation 
Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (SIS Act).  There is, at present, no provision 
within the SIS Act that requires a fund to transfer benefits at the request of a 
member; 
(b) Portability is to be implemented by way of regulations
1 which will require the 
trustees of all regulated superannuation funds to transfer an amount in respect of a 
member's superannuation benefits to another regulated superannuation fund
2, at 
the request of that member; 
(c) The transfer will be subject to the receiving fund being willing to accept the 
transfer; 
(d) Portability would apply to the withdrawal benefits
3 of a fund member; and,  
(e) Funds would be required to transfer benefits as soon as practicable following 
receipt of a request from a member but within 90 days of the request. 
 
These regulations provide a clear mechanism for the transfer of balances in a defined 
contribution fund but the Government wishes the portability proposals to be extended to 
members of a defined benefit scheme. 
                                                 
1 Under sections 31 and 32 of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (SIS Act). 
2 The regulations apply also to ADF, RSA or EPSSS. 
3 The term 'withdrawal benefits' is defined in the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Regulations 1994 
(SIS Regulations) (regulation 1.03). 
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We argue that extension of portability to defined benefits schemes is not necessary.  The 
argument in favour of portability for members of defined contribution funds who, as has 
been stated previously bear the investment risk and hence has an unqualified right to 
determine where and how their contributions should be invested.  Furthermore, the 
introduction of portability will correct a serious design fault of the original SG and award 
superannuation schemes.  Nearly all people who joined superannuation schemes 
consequent on the introduction of compulsory superannuation became members of 
accumulation schemes. 
 
Members of defined benefit schemes have an entitlement relating to defined retirement 
benefits; their current entitlements are the present worth of this entitlement at retirement.  
Many defined benefit superannuation schemes, particularly in the public sector, are 
unfunded and hold no assets against the current entitlements of members.  The 
Government proposes to exempt such public sector schemes in the Commonwealth and 
States from the portability provisions.  The remaining defined benefit schemes have 
relatively few members and portability provisions are a special case which should not be 
confused and lumped together with portability provisions accumulation schemes. 
 
Exit Fees 
The Government does not intend to impose new limits on exit fees considering that 
previous action in terms of a stronger disclosure regime for superannuation funds will 
mean that members are informed about exit fee prior to or shortly after joining a fund.  
Trustees are required to provide a Product Disclosure Statement (PDS) to members.  The 
Government, however, reserves the right to regulate exit fees if there is evidence that exit 
fee arrangements were being structured for the purpose of preventing portability from 
operating as intended. 
 
Freezing portability 
APRA would be able to freeze the transfer of benefits or a proportion of benefits out of a 
fund to another fund where there are prudential concerns. Such concerns would arise if 
APRA has a reason to believe that the transfer of funds would prejudice: 
 
(a) The financial position of the fund; or, 
(b) The interests of the fund members. 
 
In such instances, APRA would be able to suspend or vary the fund's obligation to pay 
the benefit for such period as APRA determines.  APRA would also have the discretion 
to freeze portability of benefits where the trustee of the fund has made an application to 
APRA to do so.  Once APRA had ceased a freeze, the maximum notification period for 
the transfer of benefits would recommence for any outstanding requests for transfer. 
 
     12 
Consumer protection and disclosure issues 
Many of the disclosure requirements that are necessary for portability are already 
provided by the Corporations Act 2001 (Corporations Act).  The general disclosure 
requirements under the Corporations Act harmonise the disclosure requirements for 
financial products, including superannuation.  In addition, the Corporations Act now 
provides enhanced service provider licensing and conduct regimes.  Disclosure 
requirements for superannuation funds are provided under the Corporations Act, as 
amended by the Financial Services Reform Act 2001 (FSR amendments), which 
commenced on 11 March 2002.  These disclosure requirements ensure that all 
prospective public offer fund members are made aware of the level of exit fees and other 
conditions prior to joining and transferring their benefits into a superannuation fund.  At 
the time a superannuation interest is recommended or issued a Product Disclosure 
Statement (PDS) is required to be given to a prospective member.  The PDS must include 
information about any amounts that will or may be payable, either by the holder or out of 
a common fund, in respect of the product after its acquisition, including exit fees. 
 
Information about current fund 
Members require information about their current fund and the status of their benefits.  
The Corporations Act disclosure obligations include a requirement for fund trustees to 
provide certain member and fund information after each reporting period (usually 12 
months).  This includes: 
 
(a) The amount of the member's withdrawal benefit at the start of the reporting 
period; 
(b) The amount of the member's withdrawal benefit at the end of the reporting period; 
(c) The method by which that amount was worked out; 
(d) The proportion of that benefit that must be preserved; 
(e) The amount payable on a member's death and details of any disability benefits; 
(f)  A description of the fund's investment strategy and investment objectives of the 
fund; 
(g) A statement of fund assets and information on the fund's rate of net earnings; and, 
(h) Information relating to the fees, charges, expenses and administrative or other 
operational costs of the fund and the amount of fees and charges deducted by the 
fund from any account held in respect of the member. 
 
The Government considers that fund trustees should also be required to provide 
information to members on request that would allow them to make an informed decision 
about the transfer of their superannuation benefits.  This information should include the 
member's withdrawal benefit and amount of exit fees that would be payable at that point 
in time.  
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Market conduct 
The FSR amendments to the Corporations Act have drawn together separate regulation of 
financial advice in relation to different types of financial products into a single licensing 
regime for persons seeking to carry on a financial services business.  Accordingly, 
persons who advise on superannuation products (both life and non-life products) will be 
subject to licensing or authorisation requirements administered by the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission.  Licensed financial service providers are subject 
to a range of measures regulating their conduct and disclosure under the Corporations 
Act, designed to provide for a high level of consumer protection. 
 
Education campaign 
The Government would conduct an education campaign prior to the commencement of 
portability.  The campaign would be designed to meet the information needs of both fund 
trustees and fund members. 
 
POSSIBLE ANSWERS TO OBJECTIONS TO PORTABILITY 
 
Some of the popular objections to portability include the following: 
 
a)  Members are unable to understand superannuation;  
b)  Members need more information about superannuation.   
 
We argue that under compulsory superannuation, members are not required to understand 
superannuation as there are no actions required of members under the current 
arrangements where contributions are deducted before net earnings are paid to members; 
contributions are paid to a fund irrespective of the wishes of the member; contributions 
are invested by trustees without reference to members and the accumulated balances are 
paid to members on retirement from the workforce. 
 
Under these arrangements it is not rational for members to take any steps to understand 
superannuation as gaining that understanding is a net cost.  Nevertheless, it is clear that 
there is a high level of understanding of the problems of superannuation, as shown by 




We would point to contrary evidence that people can understand complex financial 
information and make rational choices in the face an extensive menu of choice.  Since 
deregulation of the financial sector, the range of financial products available has 
increased dramatically.  The Wallis Committee showed that prior to 1980, each mortgage 
loan provider offered an average of two varieties of mortgage products.  These loans 
were also fairly basic, with limited flexibility in their terms and conditions 
                                                 
4 Our information is that members are well aware of the problem of multiple accounts and that attempts to 
combine accounts are frustrated by an outright refusal of trustees to allow transfer of balances. 
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In 1996, there were approximately 1,760 differentiated mortgage products offered by a 
range of suppliers.  The mortgage products included a range of residential, investment 
and equity mortgages offered by 150 financial institutions, each offering an average of 12 
different mortgage products.  There are more substantial differentiating features which 
include variable and fixed interest rate facilities, ‘honeymoon’ interest rates, redraw 
facilities and arrangements for setting off interest between savings and loan balances. 
 
Consumers have been able to negotiate the new regime of expanded choice easily.  The 
results of the deregulation of the financial sector and expanded choice have been to 
reduce interest rates paid by consumers and to reduce the margins of traditional lenders 
while, at the same time, there has been an increase in mortgage funding by non-
traditional lenders. 
 
Similarly, the range of deposit products expanded; in 1980, those available to most 
consumers consisted of passbook accounts and term deposits.  Only a small number of 
consumers, often those running businesses, had personal cheque accounts.  Cheque 
accounts were held with one of the 10 trading banks, and each bank offered only a single 
type of cheque account product in 1980.  In 1996, there were 1,800 different types of 
deposit accounts on offer.  An innovation over the period 1980-1996 has been 
comprehensive banking service packages which include various combinations of savings, 
loan (including lines of credit) and transaction services; some include full interest offset 
with no formal loan installments, no monthly repayments and full, automatic redraw.  
 
While it is claimed that members need more information about superannuation, it is not 
obvious that there is unambiguous objective information which will be conveyed to 
members; industry participants will wish to present training in conventions of funds 
management industry and propaganda to members to maintain the status quo.  The most 
constructive action to provide more information for members would be for APRA to and 
release all information about individual superannuation funds on a searchable database. 
 
In 2003, the ANZ Bank released a survey of financial literacy but the survey is unable to 
resist editoralising about the results and pushing the propaganda line that the current 
superannuation arrangements will provide “adequate” levels of retirement benefits.  The 
survey found: 
 
“Of those with superannuation, 50% considered it would be 
adequate for their retirement.  
Given the limited extent of planning (37% had worked out how 
much they needed to retire),” 
 
But was unable to resist the unwarranted assertion that  
 
“…the reality is that this is unlikely to be the case, indicating 
that many may have a false sense of security regarding 
superannuation”. 
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Superannuation currently provides a retirement income for only a small proportion of 
retirees and this position will not change significantly over the next 20 years.  Currently 
54 per cent of persons eligible by age for an Age Pension receive a full rate pension and 
another 28 per cent receive a part pension.  The Treasury’s Intergenerational Report 
estimates that, in 2040, 50 per cent of persons of pension age will receive an age pension.  
This is as a result of the low workforce participation rate of people over 45 years of age; 
currently 38 per cent of people aged 55-64 years are in receipt of Commonwealth 
government income support (so that over half of people receiving an age pension move 
seamlessly on to that pension from another benefit).  
 
The results of a survey about attitudes to retirement income, risks (“Retirement Savings - 
Drivers and Desires”) conducted by IFSA indicated that respondents showed a strong 
preference for a lump sum on retirement, were highly averse to risk, and were averse to 
retirement income products with little or no residual value, no possibility of withdrawal 
of capital and no age pension benefits Drew, Stanford and Stanhope (2003).  The data 
from the Drivers and Desires project revealed that 85 per cent of retirees receive a 
pension and that the pension is the principal source of income for 75 per cent of retirees. 
We concluded that retirees act as rational, self-seeking economic agents in structuring 
their financial affairs in order to obtain the age pension and that pension policy contain 
substantial disincentives to save
5. 
 
                                                 
5 We considered a specific example of a couple retiring with the mean capital sum of $234,000, in 
September 2002, which is the mean sum as reported in Drivers and Desires. The couple could purchase the 
equivalent of the age pension through a growth pension for $224, 837 leaving assets of $9,163. 
Alternatively, they could spend $24,337 in ways which would not affect their eligibility for an age pension, 
and retain $200, 500 in assets.  
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Figure 3 illustrates that the median level of superannuation by household; households 
with a head of aged 55-64 have median superannuation assets of less than $60,000 which 
is significantly below the maximum allowed under the age pension . 
 











15-24  25-34  75+  35-44 45-54 55-64 65-75
Source: Northwood et al. (2002)
 
 
The Senate Select Committee on Superannuation  
This Committee, which reported on the portability proposals in September 2003, 
purported to support the principle of portability and the ability of individuals to 
consolidate their superannuation accounts (pxiii) but believes that portability out of an 
active account is an issue which is better dealt with through choice of funds legislation on 
the grounds of efficiency and consumer protection (pxiv).  It should be noted that the 
Committee opposed the choice of funds proposals and the Senate rejected the choice of 
funds bill. 
 
The opposition to transfers from active funds i.e. a fund into which SG contribution are 
being made on the grounds that such transfers constitute choice of funds.  A submission 
cited by the Committee expressed the view: 
 
“Portability without choice could become a backdoor version of 
choice: the employer pays contributions into a fund and the 
employee systematically channels them into a different fund.” 
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The attitude embodied in this quotation is that employer sovereignty not consumer 
sovereignty should prevail at all times. 
 
The appropriate response to the hypothetical situation above is to say that if employees 
do not prefer the fund that their employer has chosen for them without their permission 
the employer’s choice should be overridden.  It is our argument that it is not the role of 
the employer to tell employees that their preferences cannot be met. 
 
The Committee expressed concerns that ‘portability out of active superannuation 
accounts could lead to an increase in superannuation account numbers in Australia, rather 
than the desired decrease”.  The Committee does not provide any analysis to support this 
assertion; on any reasonable analysis, it is improbable in the extreme.  To be true it would 
require portability to lead to the opening of more accounts than would be closed.  In any 
case, even if this improbable assertion were true, why would it be a problem?  The 
increase in accounts would be the result of choice of members. 
 
The Senate Committee has been wound up and this Report will be its last.  This is a 
suitable outcome as there have been substantial systematic problems with the 
Committee’s mode of operation and its conclusions.  The Committee has acted only on 
submissions and in doing so has implicitly assumed that all submissions are of value and 
all submissions are of equal value.  The Committee does not investigate issues raised in 
the submissions much less take expert advice.  The best example of this is that the 
Committee does not consider the Wallis Committee findings and has not sought to obtain 
advice from any members of the Wallis Committee.  The result is that submissions are 
dominated by self-interest parties who are allowed to make uncontested assertions and 
have these assertions regarded as factual and valid
6. 
 
The assertions are propaganda for the views of the self-interest parties and are often self 
contradictory.  One example of this relates to timing of portability.  The Corporate Super 
Fund Association suggested that members could time their departure from a fund where 
reserves have been allocated and re-enter when reserves have climbed (p55).  This 
contrasts to the view that members do not understand superannuation and need education 
to be able to make an informed choice; at the same time it is held that members can 
engage in a complex strategy.  We would argue, in any case, that members should seek to 
maximize their returns to superannuation so that seeking to join a fund with higher 
reserves is a rational strategy. 
 
                                                 
6 One instance is in relation to group life insurance; most superannuation funds provide compulsory life 
cover. Funds argue (p31) portability may affect the willingness of insurers to provide group cover. 
However, it appears that funds provide life cover for their own benefit, to obtain commission from 
premiums, for trustees and other parties to obtain benefits from insurance companies. An important issue is 
that members may not opt out of group insurance; we have evidence that funds have no provision for 
members to elect that their premium be used to increase their superannuation benefits. 
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The appropriate response of a fund, in these circumstances, is not to deny portability but 
not to hold reserves.  The Corporate Super Fund Association assets that the objectives of 
holding reserves to smooth crediting rates is to promote fairness between members and/or 
to promote the understanding that returns are stable over time.  Promoting fairness 
between members in an accumulation fund requires that returns are credited to members’ 
account when they are earned.  The notion that “returns are stable over time” is counter-
factual; members understand only too well given the performance of superannuation 
funds over the last three years that returns are highly volatile over time and that funds are 




The economic case for portability of superannuation is based on the fundamental 
principle of consumer sovereignty and the prediction that economic welfare and 
economic efficiency would be increased by the adoption of portability.  Portability is 
necessary in relation to defined contribution funds whose members bear the investment 
risk.  The vast majority of members belong to this type of fund.  The objectives of 
members of defined contribution funds is to maximize their retirement benefit i.e. the 
terminal benefit paid by their superannuation fund.  The strategy to achieve this is to 
minimize fees paid in superannuation and to use a passive asset selection strategy. 
 
Portability is opposed by trustees and fund managers who fear that their economic 
interests will be harmed by portability.  These fears are well based; portability would be 
predicted to reduce the number of superannuation accounts and bring about a transfer of 
balances from actively managed funds to passively managed funds.  
 
Although it may be preferable, in principle, to provide more information to members of 
funds, we argue that there is enough information available now to allow members to 
make valid choices.  Although current consumer protection measures in superannuation 
are inadequate, introduction of portability by placing pressures on trustees and funds 
managers is the most effective form of improving consumer protection. 
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